Hi quest ,  welcome  |  sign in  |  sign up  |  need help ?
Showing posts with label Special. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Special. Show all posts

Special report: Jerry Brown's California budget nightmare

Written By Guru Cool on Friday, January 13, 2012 | 12:25 PM

California Governor Jerry Brown introduces his state budget proposal at the State Capitol in Sacramento in this January 5, 2012 file photo. Brown pledged to cut the Gordian Knot of California government and reform the hopelessly overextended state, where the mortgage crisis lingers and unemployment is stuck in the double-digits; but has found it more difficult task than first thought. REUTERS/Max Whittaker/Files

1 of 9. California Governor Jerry Brown introduces his state budget proposal at the State Capitol in Sacramento in this January 5, 2012 file photo. Brown pledged to cut the Gordian Knot of California government and reform the hopelessly overextended state, where the mortgage crisis lingers and unemployment is stuck in the double-digits; but has found it more difficult task than first thought.

Credit: Reuters/Max Whittaker/Files

By Peter Henderson and Dan Levine


SACRAMENTO, California (Reuters) - Last summer, just days before California was required by law to pass a state budget, Republican State Senator Tom Harman got word that he'd been summoned to meet Governor Jerry Brown "right now." Harman, a veteran legislator from conservative Orange County, hurried downstairs to the Horseshoe, the governor's suite of offices in the state capitol building.


Harman was one of five Republican senators who spent months negotiating with Brown on fiscal reforms that promised to solve the state's chronic money woes and restore the Golden State's faded glory. But no deal had been reached.


Harman found Brown alone in his office, and the governor made it clear who he thought was at fault. He laid into Harman, screaming and swearing, veins popping from his forehead and spittle spraying from his lips, insisting the senator -- and the state -- had no option but to support Brown's plan. There was no chance for Harman to speak.


"I was silently thinking to myself,' OK, now are we going to call 911, and are they going to know how to bring the ambulance in through the basement entrance where the automobiles go?'" Harman recalled. "I thought, this guy is going to have a heart attack or a stroke. He's just going to explode right here in front of me."


Brown spokesman Gil Duran said, "There was passionate advocacy on both sides," but Harman's account was "revisionist history," and he dismissed the five senators as "irrelevant."


Harman and the governor have not spoken since that incident. Each party accuses the other of negotiating in bad faith, and Brown, 73, is taking his proposed tax increase to the voters in a November ballot initiative. Never mind that a similar gambit arguably doomed the governorship of his predecessor, Arnold Schwarzenegger.


BEYOND PARTISANSHIP


It wasn't supposed to be like this.


Like President Barack Obama, Governor Edmund Gerald Brown, Jr. came into office promising to transcend partisan divisions and solve problems. He inherited a state legislature with a dominant liberal Democratic majority and a staunchly conservative Republican minority.


Because the state constitution requires a two-thirds majority to raise taxes, which is almost unique in the United States, California became a model of governmental dysfunction. And with the economy in the tank, solutions were more urgent than ever. Brown, seasoned by a lifetime in state politics and bursting with energy, seemed like a plausible fixer.


"We need someone with insider's knowledge, but an outsider's mind. A leader who can pull people together - Republicans and Democrats, oil companies and environmentalists, unions and businesses," Brown said in the video announcing his candidacy for governor. "At this stage of my life, I'm prepared to focus on nothing else but fixing this state I love."


But Brown's failure to persuade a single Republican legislator to join his cause might say as much about the man as it does about the state's intractable budget politics.


Even some allies describe his style as that of a strong-willed CEO rather than a consensus-builder. He listens -- but then retreats with a small group of close confidantes to make his decisions.


He's a passionate and persuasive man, equally comfortable talking with corporate executives or homeless indigents, but is stymied when others don't follow logic that is obvious to him.


Brown's spokesman Duran argued that the governor demonstrated his negotiating skills last year, when, for example, he convinced Democrats to make multi-billion-dollar spending cuts and brought union and business interests together to support a budget plan the Republicans ultimately rejected. Likening Brown to a chief executive is a "bad comparison," Duran said.


Now, with few options in front of him, Brown will ask voters to approve a tax increase or face nearly $5 billion in cuts focused on education. If he succeeds in getting his ballot initiative passed, Brown could yet go down as the man who saved the state from financial ruin without entirely sacrificing its compassion. But if he fails, his legacy is likely to be that of a politician who embodied the hopes and dreams of multiple generations of Californians -- and never quite delivered.


Already, in the budget submitted for the fiscal year starting in July, Brown proposed about $4 billion in cuts to programs he believes in such as welfare and child care.


End-running the legislature on political reform is risky, however, and Democratic strategists are alarmed by the possibility that competing tax initiatives could crowd the ballot and ensure the failure of all of them.


Still, the governor is personally trusted, and Brown can use the unpopular legislature as a political foil to rally voters. Surveys suggest that Californians are open to his plan for temporary tax hikes, so it's possible that Brown's extraordinary skill as a campaigner can carry the day, sweeping aside rivals with competing plans.


"Going straight to the voters is the only path forward, and polls show that voters support his approach," said Brown spokesman Duran.


A CALIFORNIA INSTITUTION


There is a gravitas to the gaunt, intellectual Brown of today that is at odds with Governor Moonbeam, the celebrity-dating presidential aspirant and child of the 1960s (and of revered former Governor Pat Brown) who once thought California should have its own satellite.


Once nearly the youngest California governor, at age 36, and now its oldest, Brown peers out at the world from under shaggy brows and sparse, close-cropped gray hair, a sharp contrast to the thick sideburns and a hint of 5 o'clock shadow that appeared on the cover of Time just before he won the 1974 election.


Brown faded from public view after two terms as governor and two failed runs for president. But in 1998 he resurrected his political career, transforming himself into a quirky, pragmatic mayor of Oakland, the San Francisco Bay Area's crime-ridden former industrial center.


He worked closely with developers, luring thousands to live downtown, and championed charter schools -- policies that burnished his credentials as an independent thinker who wasn't afraid to shun party orthodoxy.


"Jerry Brown is a chameleon, ok?" said longtime Oakland city council member Ignacio De La Fuente, a Brown ally who marvels at the governor's peripatetic curiosity.


De La Fuente followed Brown into an abandoned building when the mayor wanted to talk to homeless. He also remembers tagging along on a spontaneous trip to the White House, when the two were in Washington, DC on other business. Brown walked up to the White House security gate, and the guard said, "Hey, governor, how are you?" Brown remembered the guard's name, De La Fuente said.


"We walk in. I mean, how many people can do that? Not too many," De La Fuente said.


After eight years in Oakland, Brown was elected California attorney general, a traditional stepping-stone to the state house; by the time the 2010 gubernatorial election came into view, the new Jerry Brown was the only serious Democratic contender.


Then, remarkably, Brown and his advisers turned the best-known politician in California into the underdog as he squared up against Republican nominee Meg Whitman. The former chief executive of eBay, Whitman ultimately spent more than $150 million (most of it her own money) on the campaign.


Brown presented himself as a straight-talking, no frills professional that voters could trust, while Whitman alienated many with her corporate style and a botched response to a scandal over an illegal immigrant housekeeper.


One of his key advisers on the campaign was a person who may represent the biggest single difference between the first Brown administration and the second: his wife, Anne Gust Brown, the former chief lawyer at Gap Inc. She also serves as a consigliore and political enforcer who is often dispatched to handle sensitive issues.


At a recent small meeting in Brown's Oakland Hills house to hammer out a pension reform plan, Labor and Workforce Secretary Marty Morgenstern, who has known his boss for three decades, remembers the governor endlessly pressing discussions into new avenues while Gust Brown would sometimes refuse to let the conversation move on before settling a point. "Between them they are almost perfect," he said.


Gust Brown was also present last February when a small group of Republican lawmakers, dubbed the GOP 5, gathered for wine and cheese at the governor's airy Sacramento loft to begin hashing out a budget that would tackle a $25 billion deficit.


The politicians swapped war stories, played with Sutter, the Browns' dog, and warmed up to each other around a picnic-style table with the governor at its head. They promised to remain collegial no matter what happened.


"It couldn't have been a more lovely gathering," recalled Sam Blakeslee, one of the Republican senators, who took a picture of the crew. "He's just the kind of guy I'd love to have dinner with."


From there, things moved quickly -- in the wrong direction.


Brown's proposed mix of revenue increases and spending cuts needed a few Republican votes to put an extension of soon-to-expire tax increases in front of voters in a special election. Republican senators wanted pension reform, regulatory reform and a spending cap on the ballot as well.


Brown's camp now says the Republicans were too scared to buck the right wing of their party and that the party leadership torpedoed talks with a 53-point list of last-minute demands. The list was delivered in March by then-Republican Senate Leader Bob Dutton, who felt the governor was trying to work around him.


Dutton acknowledged he had told his "guys" to "extend the courtesy to talk to him. Just don't agree with anything unless you talk to me first."


But the GOP 5 now say that Brown knew his union allies would never go for their pension proposals. So when a March poll showed tax hikes might fail at the ballot box while pension changes would win, Brown maneuvered to blame the Republicans for the break-down in talks.


The happy dinner conversation was quickly replaced by name-calling.


"The Republicans in Sacramento are not smart enough to write reforms," Brown's spokesman, Duran, said in a late June radio interview.


The governor "lost his nerve," responded Blakeslee. "I've spent this entire year quietly letting him cast aspersions and put blame on everyone but himself," he added. "At some point, someone has to stand up and say the emperor has no clothes."


Brown, elected as an insider, was "surprised and very disappointed" by the degree of polarization in the legislature, said an old friend, California Appeals Court Justice J. Anthony Kline. Another friend said, "He thought he'd have enough gray hair that they would listen to him. He was dead wrong." Duran said this characterization was inaccurate.


GOING IT ALONE


With his grand compromise in tatters, Brown proceeded to work with his own party in the Legislature to pass a budget that relied on massive spending cuts along with a few gimmicks.


He also pushed through plans to abolish the state's 400 redevelopment agencies, and to shift responsibility for some public safety and social service functions from the state to the counties. That made good on a campaign promise to empower local governments, and stands as one of the few clear successes of his first year.


Then, the governor took a break. Though his office would not give reporters his plans for Thanksgiving, a Los Angeles fitness studio boasted, with pictures, that the Browns spent the that week mastering reverse push ups at the Rancho La Puerta "destination fitness resort" in Baja, Mexico.


Meanwhile, the University of California, Davis found itself in the national spotlight after university police pepper-sprayed peaceful student protestors. Brown said nothing until he reemerged more than a week after the episode.


Now he's back in the spotlight, determined to reverse his first-year struggles by avoiding his Republican adversaries altogether.


"I am going directly to the voters because I don't want to get bogged down in partisan gridlock as happened this year," Brown said in December's Open Letter to the People of California announcing a ballot initiative for temporary tax increases.


Unfortunately for Brown, some of his allies have their own ideas for tax-hiking ballot initiatives, and they are not eager to step aside. At least four groups are preparing to mount signature campaigns to get tax measures on the November ballot.


Billionaire investor Nicolas Berggruen, with support from a bipartisan group of well-known Californians, pledged $20 million to a possible initiative that would revamp the tax code, expand the sales tax and bring billions more in revenue.


But Brown's biggest worry, one source said, is a proposal spearheaded by Molly Munger, a politically simpatico Los Angeles civil rights lawyer whose father is Warren Buffet's partner at Berkshire Hathaway. She's promoting a ballot measure to raise $10 billion a year for the state's beleaguered education system with a sliding-scale income tax increase.


Even though Brown's plan is also billed as an education-funding mechanism, Munger said the fine print leaves some doubt about whether the money will actually make it to schools.


Shortly before Christmas, Munger said she received a blunt message from Gust Brown, delivered over the phone.


"'We have this wired, get out of way,'" Munger recalled being told. "She didn't say that, but that was the gist." Munger said she has the resources and commitment to back her plan all the way, but that she's still open to talks with Brown.


Brown spokesman Duran said Munger's account of the phone conversation was not accurate, and that the governor continued to believe that his own plan was "the best and most viable."


In the end, political reality may winnow the field of ballot measures. "The very reasonable scenario is that only one of them gets any juice," said Dean Vogel, head of California's largest teacher's union -- and a big potential source of funds for any election campaign.


Statewide tax initiatives have a dismal track record in recent years, however. The 60 percent approval for Brown's plan among voters in a recent Public Policy Institute of California poll is a good start, but hardly a guarantee of success. Anti-tax groups have vowed an all-out fight.


Yet allies say Brown himself is a valuable asset.


"People see him as an opportunity to turn things around," said Jim Wunderman, chief of the Bay Area Council, a San Francisco business group that supported Brown's revenue plans last year. "There is still a lot of goodwill toward him, and you know, he's a fairly convincing individual."


The wild card may be pension reform. Brown wants the legislature to put a measure on the November ballot that would put new state employees on a hybrid plan partially pegged to market performance, like a 401k, with higher employee contributions.


Voters like those ideas, and so do Republicans, but Brown's union allies are not sold on the measure. "That's not a settled issue with us, and there's still work that needs to be done," said Art Pulaski of the California AFL-CIO.


With a political constellation like this, one might expect Brown to seek a coalition with Republicans solely on pension reform. One willing ally is Senator Bill Emmerson - an original member of the GOP 5.


Emmerson said Brown shouted at him, cancelled budget talks by leaving the senator a cell phone message, and then offered a pension plan of his own that looks a lot like what the GOP 5 suggested last year.


But Emmerson says he is ready to work together again. The day Brown announced his pension plan, Emmerson called to offer his congratulations. Brown didn't take the call, and more than two months later he hasn't returned it.


"I'm baffled by it, to be honest," said Emmerson. "I'm waiting for his phone call."


(Additional reporting by Sarah McBride; Editing by Lee Aitken and Jonathan Weber)

12:25 PM | 0 comments

Special report: Romney's steel skeleton in the Bain closet

Written By Guru Cool on Sunday, January 8, 2012 | 5:22 AM

Former steel worker Joe Soptic stands near a giant drive wheel that was used by a steel mill that closed due to bankruptcy in 2001 and is now thought of as a memorial to the days that Kansas City, Missouri, December 15, 2011.REUTERS/Dave Kaup

1 of 12. Former steel worker Joe Soptic stands near a giant drive wheel that was used by a steel mill that closed due to bankruptcy in 2001 and is now thought of as a memorial to the days that Kansas City, Missouri, December 15, 2011.

Credit: Reuters/Dave Kaup

By Andy Sullivan and Greg Roumeliotis


KANSAS CITY, Missouri (Reuters) - It was funny at first.


The young men in business suits, gingerly picking their way among the millwrights, machinists and pipefitters at Kansas City's Worldwide Grinding Systems steel mill. Gaping up at the cranes that swung 10-foot cast iron buckets through the air. Jumping at the thunder from the melt shop's electric-arc furnace as it turned scrap metal into lava.


"They looked like a bunch of high school kids to me. A bunch of Wall Street preppies," says Jim Linson, an electronics repairman who worked at the plant for 40 years. "They came in, they were in awe."


Apparently they liked what they saw. Soon after, in October 1993, Bain Capital, co-founded by Mitt Romney, became majority shareholder in a steel mill that had been operating since 1888.


It was a gamble. The old mill, renamed GS Technologies, needed expensive updating, and demand for its products was susceptible to cycles in the mining industry and commodities markets.


Less than a decade later, the mill was padlocked and some 750 people lost their jobs. Workers were denied the severance pay and health insurance they'd been promised, and their pension benefits were cut by as much as $400 a month.


What's more, a federal government insurance agency had to pony up $44 million to bail out the company's underfunded pension plan. Nevertheless, Bain profited on the deal, receiving $12 million on its $8 million initial investment and at least $4.5 million in consulting fees.


PROFITABLE FAILURES


In his campaign for president, Romney has championed free markets and vowed to shrink the role of government. The Republican has argued that his business acumen makes him the best candidate to fix the nation's economy and bring down the stubbornly high unemployment rate. Romney's opponents point to his business career as evidence that he is willing to cut jobs and benefits.


The story of Bain's failed investment in the Kansas City mill offers a perspective on a largely overlooked chapter in Romney's business record: His firm's brush with a U.S. bailout.


His supporters say the pension gap at the Kansas City mill was an unforeseen consequence of a falling stock market and adverse market conditions. But records show that the mill's Bain-backed management was confronted several times about the fund's shortfall, which, in the end, required an infusion of funds from the federal Pension Benefits Guarantee Corp.


Romney's career at Bain included both successes and failures. That is not unusual in the private equity business, where investors buy troubled companies and try to turn them around, often through aggressive use of debt.


"Bain Capital invested in many businesses," Romney spokesman Ryan Williams said in a written statement. "While not every business was successful, the firm had an excellent overall track record and created jobs with well-known companies like Staples, Dominos Pizza and Sports Authority."


Bain showed a remarkable knack for turning a profit. A prospectus from the year 2000 obtained by the Los Angeles Times shows that the buyout firm delivered an average annual return on investment of 88 percent between its founding in 1984 and the end of 1999.


Romney headed the firm for that entire period, except for a hiatus in 1990 to 1992, when he returned to Bain Capital's sister consulting firm, Bain & Co. In 1999 he left the business to run the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City.


The steel company declared bankruptcy in 2001. Romney continued receiving dividends from Bain after his departure. He accumulated a personal fortune of between $190 million and $250 million, according to campaign disclosure forms.


Steven Kaplan, a University of Chicago professor of entrepreneurship and finance, describes Bain's track record under Romney as "fantastic," even if some ventures ended in failure.


"You don't do this by just squeezing out costs. Those kinds of returns only come from growth," he said. "Yes, they had some bad investments, I guess in the same way presidents make some bad calls."


CASHING IN


Overall, Bain made at least $12 million on the steel company it created by merging the Kansas City mill with another in South Carolina before the new entity declared bankruptcy in 2001. Bain also collected an additional $900,000 a year through 1999 for management consulting services, public filings show.


Some analysts say Bain should not be blamed for the company's failure, noting that a wave of cheap imports forced nearly half of the U.S. steel industry into bankruptcy during that period. Another company set up around the same time, in which Bain took a minority stake, Steel Dynamics in Fort Wayne, Indiana, thrived.


"GS and Steel Dynamics were about as different as it gets," industry analyst Michelle Applebaum said. GS's core products were vulnerable to competition while Steel Dynamics became "one of the country's lowest-cost manufacturers of steel sheet," a product with more staying power. Steel Dynamics was also a non-union shop.


Former company executives say they were generally satisfied with Bain's leadership, but they say the firm would have been better equipped to weather tough times had it not been saddled with such a heavy debt load.


They also fault Bain for putting inexperienced managers in place and spurning a buyout offer from a competitor. Workers say efforts to cut corners often backfired, driving costs higher.


The Kansas City millworkers, meanwhile, are still fuming, after being left with no health benefits and a reduced pension check.


"Romney cost me lots and lots of sleepless nights and lots and lots of money," said Ed Stanger, who worked at the plant for nearly 30 years.


A GOOD LIVING


Since opening in 1888 as The Kansas City Bolt and Nut Co., the steelworks that sprawl along the Blue River valley in the city's northeast corner provided a steady and prestigious living for thousands of men. It was hard, dirty, dangerous work. The plant kept two surgeons on site in case of accidents, and death on the job was not unknown.


When summer temperatures would top 100 degrees, workers wore long johns under their protective suits so their sweat could offer some relief.


Still, it wasn't easy to get a job at the mill. The pay was good, lifting countless families into the middle class. Workers bought houses and cars and sent their kids to college.


"Hard work is supposed to pay off," said John Cottrell, who spent decades working with molten metal. White burn marks crisscross his massive forearms, and years of asbestos exposure have left him short of breath. Sitting at his kitchen table in the working class suburb of Independence, he looks a decade older than his 64 years.


At its peak in 1970, the Kansas City plant, then owned by Armco Steel Corp, employed 4,500 people. Poor market conditions forced a wave of layoffs in the early 1980s and led the company to prune its product line. By the early 1990s, the plant focused on two items: wire for products such as mattress springs and tires; and high-carbon balls and rods used by the mining industry to pulverize rocks.


It was around that time that the mill workers started noticing the kids in suits.


Armco wanted to sell its Kansas City plant to concentrate on other aspects of its business. Jack Stutz and a few of the other Armco managers were looking for backers to help them buy it. They spoke to GE Capital, which, in turn, contacted Bain Capital because it had earned a sterling reputation for turning companies around.


The risks were obvious. The mill's equipment was out of date and it faced stiff competition from Nucor Corp, which also made grinding balls.


Nevertheless, Bain and its partners decided to buy the mill for $75 million. Bain put up about $8 million to gain majority control of the company, renamed GS Technologies Inc. GE Capital, former Armco executives and Leggett & Platt, a major customer for the mill's wire rods, chipped in the rest of the equity.


As part of the deal, Armco agreed to cover employee pension obligations if the plant closed within five years -- a $120 million liability, according to the Kansas City Business Journal.


THE BIG DIVIDEND


Bain got its money back quickly. The new company issued $125 million in bonds and paid Bain a $36.1 million dividend in 1994.


"Paying distributions with debt is not uncommon," said Campbell Harvey, a finance professor at Duke University. "The only thing that strikes me as a bit unusual is the size of the dividend. There would be logic in them saving some cash for a downturn."


Looking back on the dividend payout, Stutz and another former GS Technologies officer, Mario Concha, believe it weakened the mill's financial position.


"At the time they paid that dividend, they felt that the financials justified it," Stutz said.


GS announced plans for a $98 million plant modernization and Kansas City officials agreed to a tax break worth about $3 million, according to press accounts.


In 1995 Bain merged GS with another wire rod maker in Georgetown, South Carolina, to form one of the largest mini-mill steel producers in the U.S. The new company issued another $125 million in bonds to pay for the merger. Bain doubled down, reinvesting $16.5 million of its earlier dividend.


The new company, dubbed GS Industries Inc., would have annual revenues of $1 billion and employ 3,800 people.


Already, though, there were warning signs that the company was not on a sustainable course. Concerned about the level of debt, which totaled $378 million in 1995 on operating income less than a tenth of that amount, the merged company's new CEO, Roger Regelbrugge, negotiated a clause in his contract that would allow him to retire at the end of 1997.


Regelbrugge said he was concerned that the company would have to go through a painful restructuring if it had not sold shares through an initial public offering (IPO) by then.


Regelbrugge had done one restructuring in the 1980s at the South Carolina mill, laying off workers and haggling with creditors. He did not want to go through that painful process again.


"Unless we had plans to go public at that time, I did not want to carry that debt load ad infinitum," he said.


Over the next two years, GS Industries completed its upgrade of the Kansas City plant and laid the groundwork for an IPO to pay down some of the debt.


Meanwhile, managers struggled to forge a cohesive whole from two companies that made similar products but had different corporate cultures, different manufacturing processes and different labor contracts.


"I guess the two cultures never really got together," Stutz said.


ON STRIKE


In 1997, with Armco's pension guarantees set to expire in one year, the United Steelworkers local at the Kansas City plant was worried that GS was not setting aside enough money to cover pension obligations and other benefits in the event of a shutdown.


David Foster, the negotiator for the union, said labor talks were typically more tense at companies owned by private equity firms because the high level of debt left managers with less flexibility.


Contract talks foundered and the union went on strike in April 1997. The first standoff since 1959 quickly turned nasty. Workers shot bottle rockets at security guards, tossed nails in the roadways to flatten the tires of nonunion trucks and pounded on the windows of vehicles as they left the plant.


After 10 weeks, the two sides reached a deal that boosted pensions and ensured that workers would get health and life insurance in the event of a shutdown.


The workers put down their picket signs, but the equipment upgrades weren't delivering productivity gains as quickly as hoped. At the end of 1997, Regelbrugge decided to retire rather than stick around for an IPO that wasn't going to materialize.


Shortly after that, an industry competitor offered "a whole lot of money" to buy GS, according to Regelbrugge, but Bain turned it down. A company insider said the suitor was the global behemoth Mittal Steel Company, but added that no formal offer was ever made.


As GS Industries sought to cut costs, it hired line managers with no experience in the steel industry, workers said. One had worked at Walmart; many others came straight out of the military.


"He would come up with some of the stupidest damn ideas that you ever seen," the former steelworker Linson said of one supervisor, a retired Air Force colonel.


Paperwork proliferated. Cost-cutting efforts backfired. Managers skimped on purchases of everything from earplugs to spare motors and scaled back routine maintenance. Machines began to break down more often, and with parts no longer in stock a replacement could take days to arrive.


Labor costs spiked as managers revamped work schedules with little understanding of how the plant actually operated. Linson says he picked up an entire shift of overtime each week because his managers didn't realize that a furnace needed a full eight hours to heat up to operating temperature.


"That didn't work to their advantage," he said. "I made a lot of money."


Daily life at the plant was also growing more dangerous. Veteran crane operator Ed Mossman says he was ordered to pick up a load of steel that was 50 percent above the recommended weight limit - a prospect that could have toppled the crane and sent Mossman plunging to his death. When he refused, he says, he was fired after putting in 29 years at the mill.


"The first 15 years, I had the best job in the United States, as far as I was concerned," Mossman said. "The last five years down there got to be pure hell."


Meanwhile, a wave of cheap imports from Asia drove steel prices down sharply, while costs for natural gas and electricity rose. The Asian financial crisis lowered demand for mined metals, which hit the company's grinding-ball business.


The company, along with other steelmakers, successfully petitioned the U.S. International Trade Commission for tariff rate quotas on imported wire rods and also entered the federal loan guarantee program for troubled steel companies -- two remedies at odds with a free-market stance. Romney now says it was a mistake for the government to try to protect the steel industry.


Nevertheless, net losses at the company grew to $52.9 million in 1999 from $16.1 million in 1997, while operating income dropped to $9.6 million from $37.9 million over the same period -- not enough to sustain the firm's debt and obligations for long.


THE BLAME GAME


Charles Bradford, an analyst at Bradford Research, blames the union, in part, for the failure of GS Industries to survive in the new global marketplace.


"If you look at the steel companies that went under at the time, all of them were unionized," he said. "I'm not saying this was the only factor -- these firms faced other headwinds such as cheap labor and a strong dollar ... but the unions held them back."


Union officials blame the Bain managers for saddling the company with too much debt for a capital-intensive, cyclical industry such as steel. "They look at ways to try to leverage the financial resources of the company during an uptick in the markets, stream money out of it and leave wreckage behind them," said the union's Foster.


Regelbrugge blames his successor, Mark Essig, for installing senior managers who did not know the business. "I have no question that the company would have survived under different management," he said. Essig did not return calls seeking comment.


A spokesman for Bain Capital said: "Over $100 million and many thousands of hours were invested in GSI to upgrade its facilities and make the company more competitive during a 7-year period when the industry came under enormous pressure and 44 U.S. steel companies went into bankruptcy. In the same period, we worked to turn around GSI, we helped launch and grow an innovative business called Steel Dynamics that is today a $6 billion global leader.... Our focus remains on building great companies and improving their operations."


GS Industries declared bankruptcy on February 7, 2001, and said it would shut down the Kansas City plant, eliminating 750 jobs. In a press release, the company said the bankruptcy was triggered in part by "the critical need to restructure the company's liabilities."


Workers soon found out what that meant. In April, GS said it was shedding the guarantees it had promised its workers in the event of a plant closure - the severance pay, health insurance, life insurance and pension supplements that had been negotiated during the 1997 strike.


Workers could buy health insurance through the company's plan, but the company would no longer share its costs. For many who were struggling with asbestosis or other ailments contracted during their years of work, the cost was prohibitive.


"The wife and I, we just held our breath and prayed a lot," said Stanger, the ex-millworker. He was quoted a price of $1,800 per month - more than his pension payment.


FEDERAL AID


The U.S. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp, which insures company retirement plans, determined in 2002 that GS had underfunded its pension by $44 million. The federal agency, funded by corporate levies, stepped in to cover the basic pension payments, but not the supplement the union had negotiated as a hedge against the plant's closure.


For Joe Soptic, who worked at the plant for 28 years, that meant a loss of $283 per month, about 22 percent of his pension. Others lost up to $400 per month, according to documents supplied by the union.


Comparatively, the GS bailout was one of the pension guarantor's smaller hits. The federal fund swung from a $7.7 billion surplus to a $3.6 billion deficit that year as it struggled to cover bankruptcies in the steel and transportation industries. The failure of LTV Steel, for example, cost the agency $1.9 billion.


The agency's woes prompted Congress in 2006 to require companies to contribute more toward their pensions. Press accounts said this change accelerated the shift away from pension plans toward 401(k)s and other defined-contribution retirement plans that offer less security for workers.


Many of the older workers at the Kansas City mill were just a few years away from Social Security and Medicare, but younger workers didn't have that safety net. Even with $600,000 earmarked by the U.S. Labor Department for job retraining, many had trouble finding work.


"They give you a year's worth of training, you're 50-something years old, nobody wants to hire you," said Steve Morrow, who retrained in the field of heating and air conditioning.


After nearly 30 years as a steelworker, Joe Soptic found a job as a school custodian. The $24,000 salary was roughly one-third of his former pay, and the health plan did not cover his wife, Ranae.


When Ranae started losing weight, "I tried to get her to the doctor and she wouldn't go," Soptic said. She ended up in the county hospital with pneumonia, where doctors discovered her advanced lung cancer. She died two weeks later.


Soptic was left with nearly $30,000 in medical bills. He drained a $12,000 savings account and the hospital wrote off the balance.


"I worked hard all my life and played by the rules, and they allowed this to happen," Soptic said.


(Additional reporting by Tom Hals; Editing by Lee Aitken)


PDF version - link.reuters.com/byt75s

5:22 AM | 0 comments

Categories